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Chemical and Process Engineering |
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A S Jessup-Bould: Process Safety in Design |
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Process Safety in
Design (PSiD) is a method of identifying areas of a
process design that warrants specific focus with respect to maximizing
process safety. Each area is given the appropriate level of consideration, is
documented and then subjected to independent verification during the design
development. Ideally the process design should be assessed during the early
stages of a project. BG standard
BGA-ENG-PROC-TS-0015 provides guidance on Process Safety in Design and was
used as the basis for retrospectively assessing existing BG natural gas
processing facilities in Tunisia. The output from PSiD assessments are a report which includes record cards
showing the findings of the review. The findings are coded according to the
severity of any issues found. For the assessment of these existing
facilities, verification actions are allocated a risk based action code as
follows: ·
Code 1 – The weakness identified is such to
represent a high / unacceptable risk for the asset. The resolution of this
weakness requires urgent attention from the asset’s senior management team in
order to develop and implement an improvement plan. ·
Code 2 – The weakness identified represents a
significant risk for the asset and timely action is necessary to address this
matter. ·
Code A – Design is safe and meets the required
standard. The areas of the process
design that the team assessed were: Philosophies For this PSiD a rationalised list of
design, control, isolation, relief, ESD and other philosophies were reviewed. Relief and Blowdown This assessment comprised
the following steps: ·
Identification of the pressure system around the
relief device on the P&IDs ·
Identification of available information regarding
the under / over pressure protection device ·
Identification of the potential causes of under and
over pressure ·
Determination of the expected relief rates from the
various relief scenarios ·
Determination of the required relief device size
(independent of the contractor calculations) HP/LP Interfaces This was a review of the
high and low pressure interface register against P&IDs. Layers of Protection This assessed whether or not
the design incorporated secure layers of protection in order to reduce the
risk to a manageable level. Hazard Identification As an existing asset the HazId
report was not available and therefore only the HazOp
report was reviewed. The review included terms of reference, identification
of all documentation, appropriate size and complexity of nodes as well as
completeness of node and deviation cause descriptions. The consequences were
also assessed in relation to resulting deviations from intended range of
normal operation and close outs checked. |
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